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The Myerson value for union stable systems
E. Algaba J.M. Bilbao P. Bormy J.J. López
University of Seville, Spain
yTilburg University, The Netherlands
Abstract
We study cooperation structures with the following property: Given any
two feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection, its union is a feasible
coalition again. These combinatorial structures have a direct relationship
with conference structures à la Myerson. Characterizations of the Myer-
son value in this context are provided by means of the introduction of the
concept of basis for union stable systems.
1991 Mathematics Subject Classication: 90D12
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1 Introduction
Several models of restricted cooperation have been proposed, among which are
those derived from communication situations as introduced by Myerson [4] [5].
This line of research was continued by Owen [8], Borm, Owen and Tijs [3], van den
Nouweland, Borm and Tijs [6], van den Nouweland [7], Potters and Reijnierse
[9] and Algaba et al. [1]. In Myerson's model, the bilateral relations among
the players are represented by means of an undirected graph and the feasible
coalitions are those that induce connected subgraphs.
In our restricted cooperation model, if two feasible coalitions have common
elements, these ones will act as intermediaries between the two coalitions in
order to establish meaningful cooperation in the union of these coalitions. These
feasible coalition systems will be called union stable systems. Section 2 formally
introduces our model of restricted cooperation. A relation is established between
Myerson conference structures and union stable systems by means of the basis
of a union stable system. Section 3 introduces the Myerson value for games
restricted by union stable systems and studies in detail some properties of this
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value. The concept of basis allows to extend the axiomatic characterizations
given for the Myerson value given by Myerson [4] and van den Nouweland [7].
2 Union stable systems
Denition 2.1 Let N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng be a nite set of players and F  2N a
system of feasible coalitions. The set system F is called union stable if for all
A;B 2 F with A \B 6= ; it is satised that A [B 2 F .
A communication situation is a triple (N; v;E), where (N; v) is a game and
(N;E) is a simple graph. It is easy to see that the set system F , dened by
F = fS  N : (S;E(S)) is a connected subgraph of (N;E)g;
is union stable. However, a union stable system can not always be modelled by a
communication situation. Let F be a union stable system and G  F : We dene
inductively the families
G
(0)
= G; G(n) =
n
S [ T : S; T 2 G(n 1); S \ T 6= ;
o
(n = 1; 2; : : :)
Notice that G(0)  G(n 1)  G(n)  F ; since G  F and F is union stable.
Denition 2.2 Let F be a union stable system and let G  F . We dene G by
G = G(k); where k is the smallest integer such that G(k+1) = G(k):
We are interested to obtain, for each union stable family, a minimal subset
that by the above process generates the whole union stable family. Let F be
a union stable system and G  F . If G is union stable, there can be feasible
coalitions which can be written as the union of two feasible coalitions with non-
empty intersection. So, we can consider the following set:
D (G) = fG 2 G : G = A [B; A 6= G; B 6= G; A;B 2 G; A \B 6= ;g:
Note that D (G) is composed of those feasible coalitions which can be written
as the union of two distinct feasible coalitions with non-empty intersection.
Denition 2.3 Let F be a union stable system. The set B (F) = F n D (F) ; is
called the basis of F , and the elements of B (F) are called supports of F .
We remark that the basis B (F) is the minimal subset of the union stable
system F such that B (F) = F (see Algaba el al. [1]).
Denition 2.4 Let G  2N be a set system and let S  N . A set T  S is
called a G-component of S if it is satised that T 2 G and there exists no T 0 2 G
such that T  T 0  S.
Therefore, the G-components of S are the maximal feasible coalitions that
belong to G and are contained in S. We denote by CG(S) the collection of the
G-components of S.
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Proposition 2.1 The set system F  2N is union stable if and only if for any
S  N with CF (S) 6= ;, the F-components of S are a partition of a subset of S.
Proof. Let F be union stable. Let C1, C2; be two maximal feasible coalitions
of S. If C1\C2 6= ;, then C1[C2 2 F since F is union stable and C1[C2  S.
This contradicts the fact that C1 and C2 are F -components of S.
Conversely, assume for any S such that CF (S) 6= ;, that its F -components
form a partition of a subset of S. Suppose that F is not union stable, then there
are A;B 2 F ; with A \ B 6= ; and A [ B =2 F . Hence, there must be an F-
component C1 2 CF (A[B), with A  C1 and an F-component C2 2 CF (A[B),
withB  C2 such that C1 6= C2. This contradicts the fact that the F -components
of A [B are disjoint. 2
It is obvious that if F is a union stable system such that fig 2 F ; for all
i 2 N , then the F-components of S form a partition of S. We have also the
following consequence of the denitions.
Proposition 2.2 Let F be a union stable system. Let S  N and consider the
collection FS = fF 2 F : F  Sg : Then, the following conditions are satised:
(a) FS is union stable.
(b) CF (S) = CFS (N).
(c) B (FS) = fB 2 B (F) : B  Sg.
In order to establish a relation between conference structures à la Myerson
and union stable systems, we will give the following results. Moreover, the next
theorem will be essential in order to prove the uniqueness in the axiomatization
of Myerson value in union stable systems.
Denition 2.5 Let F be a union stable system. The players i; j 2 N , are called
connected by B (F) if there exists a sequence of supports (B1; : : : ; Bk), such that
i 2 B1, j 2 Bk and if k  2, Bp \Bp+1 6= ;, for all p = 1; : : : ; k   1.
Theorem 2.3 Let F be a union stable system. Let S 2 F and i; j 2 N , i 6= j.
Then fi; jg  S if and only if i and j are connected by supports in C (F) contained
in S, where C (F) = fB 2 B (F) : jBj  2g.
Proof. Let fi; jg  S. If S 2 C (F), it suces to take k = 1 and B1 = S. If
S =2 C (F), then S = A[B; with A;B 2 F ; and A\B 6= ;: If A;B 2 C (F) then
we obtain the result. Otherwise, we repeat this decomposition and proceeding
in this manner, we obtain the sequence of supports. The converse is obvious. 2
Corollary 2.4 Let F be a union stable system. Let i; j 2 N , i 6= j. Then i
and j are in the same F-component of N if and only if i and j are connected by
C (F) :
3
Example. Myerson [4] introduced the term conference, to refer to any set of
two or more players who might meet together to discuss their cooperative plans.
A conference structure CS is any collection Q  fS  N : jSj  2g : Given a
conference structure Q 2 CS, two players i and j are connected by Q if i = j or
there exists some sequence of conferences (S1; : : : ; Sk) such that i 2 S1, j 2 Sk,
fS1; : : : ; Skg  Q, and Sp \ Sp+1 6= ; for all p = 1; : : : ; k   1.
If F is a union stable system then the set formed by the non-unitary supports
is a Myerson's conference structure. Conversely, given a Myerson's conference
structure, the set system
F = fS  N : each pair of players i; j 2 S are connected by conferences in Sg
is union stable.
3 The Myerson value: properties and axiomatizations
This section deals with a solution concept for games restricted by union stable
structures: the Myerson value. We recall that this value is the Shapley value 
of the F-restricted game.
Denition 3.1 Let (N; v) be a cooperative n-person game in coalitional form
and F  2N a union stable system. The F-restricted game vF : 2N  ! R; is
dened by
vF (S) =
X
T2CF (S)
v(T ):
A union stable structure is a triple (N; v;F) where N = f1; : : : ; ng is the set
of players, (N; v) is a game v : 2N  ! R with v(;) = 0; and F is a union stable
system.
Denition 3.2 The Myerson value of a union stable structure (N; v;F) is given
by the vector  (N; v;F) = 
 
N; vF

:
The following example illustrates the concepts introduced above.
Example. Consider the player set N = f1; 2; 3; 4g and the union stable system
given by F = ff1g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4g ; Ng : Let v : 2N  ! R be the game dened
by v(S) = jSj   1; S 6= ;, and v(;) = 0: Then, B (F) = ff1g ; f1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4gg
and C (F) = ff1; 2; 3g ; f2; 3; 4gg : In this case, it is clear that
vF (S) =

jSj   1 if S 2 F
0 otherwise,
and the Myerson value is  (N; v;F) = 112 (5; 13; 13; 5) :
We now consider some properties that would be desirable for an allocation
rule, and we focus on the study of these properties for the Myerson value. The
set of all union stable structures with player set N will be denoted by USN .
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Denition 3.3 An allocation rule on USN is a map  : USN  ! RN , such
that it is component-ecient and component-dummy, that is,
(1)
P
i2M i (N; v;F) = v(M); for all (N; v;F) 2 US
N and M 2 CF (N):
(2) i (N; v;F) = 0; for all i =2
S
M2CF (N)
M:
Lemma 3.1 The Myerson value  : USN  ! RN is an allocation rule.
Proof. Let (N; v;F) 2 USN . If N 2 F then N is its unique F-component, and
hence
P
i2N  (N; v;F) =
P
i2N i
 
N; vF

= vF (N) = v(N): Suppose, that
N =2 F and, therefore, consider the set CF (N). To each F-component M of N
is associated the game uM , which is dened in the following way , with M xed,
uM : 2N  ! R; uM (T ) = vF (T \M) =
X
H2CF (T\M)
v(H); for all T  N:
Moreover, for any coalition T  N , CF (T ) =
S
R2CF (N)
CF (T \ R); and
hence, it is immediate that vF =
P
R2CF (N)
uR: Taking into account the above
considerations for the game
 
N; vF

, we nd
X
i2M
 (N; v;F) =
X
i2M
i
 
N;uM

+
X
fR2CF (N) :R6=Mg
"X
i2M
i
 
N;uR
#
:
Since
P
i2M i
 
N;uM

= vF (M); and i(N;u
R) = 0; R 6= M; i 2 M; the
above expression implies that
P
i2M  (N; v;F) = v
F (M) = v(M):
Component-dummy is immediate since if i =2
S
M2CF (N)
M then we have
CF (S) = CF (S n fig), for all S 2 F . Hence, the marginal contributions are
vF (S)  vF (S n fig) = 0; and i (N; v;F) = 0. 2
Denition 3.4 An allocation rule  is fair if for all (N; v;F) ; B 2 B (F) ; there
exists c 2 R such that j (N; v;F)   j (N; v;F
0) = c; for all j 2 B; where
F 0 = B (F) n fBg:
So, according to a fair allocation rule all players in a support B lose or gain
the same amount if the support B is deleted. We now extend the axiomatization
of the Myerson value to union stable structures.
Theorem 3.2 The Myerson value is the unique fair allocation rule on USN .
Proof. (a) Uniqueness: Let (N; v;F) 2 USN . Suppose 1 and 2 are two fair
allocation rules on USN . We will prove by induction to the number jC (F)j of
non-unitary supports in the basis of F , that 1 (N; v;F) = 2 (N; v;F).
If jC (F)j = 0, then CF (N) = ffig : fig 2 Fg. Applying component-eciency
and component-dummy we obtain that 1 (N; v;F) = 2 (N; v;F).
5
Now, assume that 1 (N; v;G) = 2 (N; v;G) for all G with jC (G)j  k 1, and
let jC (F)j = k. Consider C 2 C (F). Fairness implies that there exist numbers
c 2 R and d 2 R such that
1j (N; v;F)   
1
j

N; v;B (F) n fCg

= c;
2j (N; v;F)   
2
j

N; v;B (F) n fCg

= d;
for all j 2 C. Note that by the induction hypothesis
1j

N; v;B (F) n fCg

= 2j

N; v;B (F) n fCg

:
So there is a constant  = c  d such that
1j (N; v;F)   
2
j (N; v;F) = ; for all j 2 C: (1)
Given M 2 CF (N), by component-eciency for 
1 and 2, we obtainX
i2M

1i (N; v;F)   
2
i (N; v;F)

= 0:
Applying theorem 2.3 and equality (1) recursively, we get
1i (N; v;F)   
2
i (N; v;F) = ;
for all i 2M , with M 2 CF (N), and this impliesX
i2M

1i (N; v;F)   
2
i (N; v;F)

= jM j:
Therefore jM j = 0; and hence 1 (N; v;F) = 2 (N; v;F).
(b) Next, we show that the Myerson value is fair. Consider the game (N;w)
given by w(S) = vF (S)   vF
0
(S); for all S  N , where F 0 = B (F) n fBg. Let
k 2 B. We may deduce that w(S) = 0; for all S  N; B " S; and, since for all
coalitions S  N with B  S we have B " S n fkg and so w(S n fkg) = 0: Thus,
we can write for k 2 B
k(N;w) =
X
fS :BSg
(s  1)! (n  s)!
n!
w(S); where s = jSj; n = jN j:
It follows that k(N;w) = p(N;w); for all p 2 B; and we obtain that the
Myerson value is fair. 2
Denition 3.5 An allocation rule  is called basis monotonic if for all (N; v;F) ;
for all B 2 B (F) ; and for all j 2 B it holds j (N; v;F)  j (N; v;F
0), where
F 0 = B (F) n fBg:
6
This condition asserts that all the players always benet from reaching an
agreement and cooperate.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N; v;F) 2 USN . If v is superadditive and zero-normalized,
then  (N; v;F) is basis monotonic.
Proof. It suces to prove that w(S)  0 for any S  N such that B  S,
where for all S  N; w(S) = vF (S)   vF
0
(S); with F 0 = B (F) n fBg. Any
maximal feasible coalition of S in F 0 is either a maximal feasible coalition of S in
F or it is contained in an F-component of S. Then, taking the F 0-components
of S and taking into consideration that the game (N; v) is superadditive and
zero-normalized, we obtain
vF
0
(S) =
X
T 02CF0 (S)
v
 
T 0


X
T2CF (S)
2
4v
0
@ [
fT 02CF0 (S) :T
0Tg
T 0
1
A
3
5  vF (S):
2
To provide other axiomatic characterizations for the Myerson value, the next
denitions are introduced (see van den Nouweland [7]). We use Ci (F) to denote
the collection fC 2 C (F) : i 2 Cg.
Denition 3.6 A union stable structure (N; v;F) is called point anonymous if
there exists a function f : f0; 1; : : : ; jDjg  ! R such that vF (S) = f (jS \Dj)
for all S  N , where D = fi 2 N : Ci (F) 6= ;g.
Denition 3.7 An allocation rule  satises point anonymity if for all point
anonymous (N; v;F), there exists  2 R such that
i (N; v;F) =

 for all i 2 D;
0 otherwise.
Proposition 3.4 The Myerson value satises point anonymity.
Proof. Let (N; v;F) 2 USN be point anonymous. If D = ;, then the restricted
game vF (S) = f (jS \ ;j) = f (0) = 0, for all S  N . Hence, i (N; v;F) = 0
for all i 2 N . Let D 6= ;. If i =2 D, obviously S \ D = (S n fig) \ D and
i (N; v;F) = 0. On the other hand, if i; j 2 D applying the symmetry property
of the Shapley value we have i (N; v;F) = j (N; v;F) ; and hence f (jDj) =P
i2D i (N; v;F) = jDji (N; v;F) : Therefore, i (N; v;F) = f (jDj) = jDj = ,
for all i 2 D and i (N; v;F) = 0; otherwise. 
Denition 3.8 Let (N; v;F) 2 USN . Then player i 2 N is called superuous
for (N; v;F) if vF (S) = vF (S n fig) ; for all S  N . An allocation rule 
satises the superuous player property if for all (N; v;F) and every player i 2 N
that is superuous for (N; v;F) it holds  (N; v;F) = 
 
N; v;FNnfig

, where
FNnfig = fF 2 F : F  N n figg :
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Proposition 3.5 The Myerson value satises the superuous player property.
Proof. Let i 2 N be a superuous player for (N; v;F) 2 USN . We have to
prove  (N; v;F) = 
 
N; v;FNnfig

. We observe that i is a zero player in vF
and this implies that i (N; v;F) = 0. Further, i
 
N; v;FNnfig

= 0, because
i =2
S
M2CF
Nnfig
(N)M and  satises component-dummy (lemma 3.1).
For the other players, it suces to show that vF (S) = vFNnfig(S); or equiv-
alently, as i is a superuous player for (N; v;F) ; that vF (S n fig) = vFNnfig(S);
for all S  N . The components satisfy CF (S n fig) = CFNnfig (S) ; and therefore
vF (S n fig) =
X
T2CF (Snfig)
v (T ) =
X
T2CF
Nnfig
(S)
v (T ) = vFNnfig(S);
for all S  N: 2
Denition 3.9 An allocation rule  is called additive if for all (N; v;F) and
(N;w;F) then  (N; v +w;F) =  (N; v;F) +  (N;w;F).
We obtain immediately that the Myerson value is additive.
Lemma 3.6 If  is an additive allocation rule that satises the superuous
player property, then  (N; v;F) = 
 
N; vF ;F

, for all (N; v;F) 2 USN .
Proof. By additivity of , it suces to show that 
 
N; v   vF ;F

= 0, for all
(N; v;F) 2 USN . Indeed, for any S  N ,
 
v   vF
F
(S) =
X
T2CF (S)
 
v   vF

(T ) =
X
T2CF (S)

v (T )  vF (T )

= 0:
Therefore, all players are superuous for any
 
N; v   vF ;F

2 USN . Hence,
taking recursively all players in the same maximal component M 2 CF (N)

 
N; v   vF ;F

= 
 
N; v   vF ;FNnM

:
For all i 2M; we obtain
i
 
N; v   vF ;F

= i
 
N; v   vF ;FNnM

= 0;
since i =2
S
H2CF
NnM
(N)H. It follows that i
 
N; v   vF ;F

= 0, for all i 2 N .2
Theorem 3.7 The Myerson value is the unique allocation rule on USN that
satises additivity, the superuous player property and point anonymity.
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Proof. Let  be an allocation rule on USN that also satises additivity, the
superuous player property and point anonymity. From lemma 3.6 we deduce
 (N; v;F) = 
 
N; vF ;F

. The unanimity games fuS : S 2 F , S 6= ;g form a
basis for the vector space of the F -restricted games (see Bilbao [2]), that is,
vF =
X
fS2F :S 6=;g
SuS
for some coecients S :Applying additivity, it suces to show that  (N;uS ;F),
is uniquely determined for all S 2 F ; S 6= ; and  2 R. Fix S and . If i 2 N nS
then for all coalitions T  N
uS (T ) = () S  T () S  T n fig () uS (T n fig) = :
We deduce that any player that is not in S is superuous and hence by the
superuous player property:
 (N;uS;F) = 
 
N;uS ;FNn(NnS)

=  (N;uS;FS) .
Since CFS (N) = CF (S) = fSg; component-dummy implies that
i (N;uS ;FS) = 0;
for all i 2 N n S: It remains only to compute i (N;uS;FS) for all i 2 S: First,
for all T  N; we have
(uS)
FS (T ) =
X
H2CFS (T )
uS(H) = () 9H 2 FS , S  H  T .
If H 2 FS then H  S, and hence (uS)
FS (T ) =  if and only if S  T .
Therefore, (uS)
FS = uS implies
(uS)
FS (T ) = uS(T ) = () S  T () S \ T = S.
It follows that there exists a function f : f0; 1; : : : ; jSjg  ! R; such that
(uS)
FS (T ) = f (jS \ T j) ; for all T  N , where f(0) =    = f (jSj   1) = 0,
and f (jSj) = . Hence (N;uS ;FS) is point anonymous and applying point
anonymity to the rule , there exists  2 R such that
i (N;uS ;FS) =

 if i 2 S;
0 otherwise.
Further, CFS (N) = fSg, and using component-eciency we getX
i2S
i (N;uS;FS) =  = jSj :
Then  = = jSj and we deduce that  (N; v;F) is the Myerson value. 2
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